Abstract-Classification is a fundamental problem in data analysis. Training a classifier requires accessing a large collection of data. Releasing person-specific data, such as customer data or patient records, may pose a threat to an individual's privacy. Even after removing explicit identifying information such as Name and SSN, it is still possible to link released records back to their identities by matching some combination of nonidentifying attributes such as fSex; Zip; Birthdateg. A useful approach to combat such linking attacks, called k-anonymization [1] , is anonymizing the linking attributes so that at least k released records match each value combination of the linking attributes. Previous work attempted to find an optimal k-anonymization that minimizes some data distortion metric. We argue that minimizing the distortion to the training data is not relevant to the classification goal that requires extracting the structure of predication on the "future" data. In this paper, we propose a k-anonymization solution for classification. Our goal is to find a k-anonymization, not necessarily optimal in the sense of minimizing data distortion, which preserves the classification structure. We conducted intensive experiments to evaluate the impact of anonymization on the classification on future data. Experiments on real-life data show that the quality of classification can be preserved even for highly restrictive anonymity requirements.
D
ATA sharing in today's globally networked systems poses a threat to individual privacy and organizational confidentiality. An example by Samarati [2] shows that linking medication records with a voter list can uniquely identify a person's name and medical information. New privacy acts and legislations are recently enforced in many countries. In 2001, Canada launched the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document Act [3] to protect a wide spectrum of information, such as age, race, income, evaluations, and even intentions to acquire goods or services. This information spans a considerable portion of many databases. Government agencies and companies have to revise their systems and practices to fully comply with this act in three years.
Consider a table T about a patient's information on Birthplace, Birthyear, Sex, and Diagnosis. If a description on fBirthplace; Birthyear; Sexg is so specific that not many people match it, releasing the table may lead to linking a unique record to an external record with explicit identity, thus identifying the medical condition and compromising the privacy rights of the individual [2] . Suppose that the attributes Birthplace, Birthyear, Sex, and Diagnosis must be released (say, to some health research institute for research purposes). One way to prevent such linking is masking the detailed information of these attributes as follows:
1. If there is a taxonomical description for a categorical attribute (for example, Birthplace), we can generalize a specific value description into a less specific but semantically consistent description. For example, we can generalize the cities San Francisco, San Diego, and Berkeley into the corresponding state California. 2. If there is no taxonomical description for a categorical attribute, we can suppress a value description to a "null value" denoted ?. For example, we can suppress San Francisco and San Diego to the null value ? while keeping Berkeley. 3. If the attribute is a continuous attribute (for example, Birthyear), we can discretize the range of the attribute into a small number of intervals. For example, we can replace specific Birthyear values from 1961 to 1965 with an interval [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] . By applying such masking operations, the information on fBirthplace; Birthyear; Sexg is made less specific, and a person tends to match more records. For example, a male born in San Francisco in 1962 will match all records that have the values hCA; ½1961 À 1966Þ; Mi; clearly, not all matched records correspond to the person. Thus, the masking operation makes it more difficult to tell whether an individual actually has the diagnosis in the matched records.
Protecting privacy is one goal. Making the released data useful to data analysis is another goal. In this paper, we consider classification analysis [4] . The next example shows that if masking is performed "carefully," privacy can be protected while preserving the usefulness for classification.
Example 1 (The running example). Consider the data in Table 1 and the taxonomy trees in Fig. 1 There is only one record for "female doctor" (the last row), which makes the person represented uniquely distinguishable from others by Sex and Education. To make "female doctor" less unique, we can generalize Masters and Doctorate to GradSchool. As a result, "she" becomes less distinguishable by being one of the four females with a graduate school degree. As far as classification is concerned, no information is lost in this generalization because Class does not depend on the distinction of Masters and Doctorate.
In the classification problem, a classifier is built from the training data and is used to classify the future data. It is important that the classifier makes use of the structure that will repeat in the future data, not the noises that occur only in the training data. In Table 1 , 19 out of 22 persons having W ork Hrs ! 37 are in the class Y, and only three persons having W ork Hrs ! 37 are in the class N. It is not likely that this difference is entirely due to sampling noises. In contrast, M and F of Sex seem to be arbitrarily associated with both classes, suggesting that sex cannot be used to predict his/her class.
In this paper, we consider the following k-anonymization for classification. The data provider wants to release a person-specific table for modeling classification of a specified class attribute in the table. Two types of information in the table are released. The first type is sensitive information, such as Diagnosis. The second type is the quasiidentifier (QID) [5] , [1] , which is a combination of attributes such as fBirthplace; Birthyear; Sexg. The QID does not identify individuals but can be used to link to a person if the combination is unique. The data provider wants to prevent linking the released records to an individual through the QID. This privacy requirement is specified by the k-anonymity [1] : If one record in the table has some value on the QID, then at least k À 1 other records have that value. The k-anonymization for classification is to produce a masked table that satisfies the k-anonymity requirement and retains useful information for classification. A formal statement will be given in Section 2.
If classification is the goal, why does not the data provider build and publish a classifier (instead of publishing the data)? There are real-life scenarios where it is necessary to release the data. First of all, knowing that the data is used for classification does not imply that the data provider knows exactly how the recipient may analyze the data. The recipient often has application-specific bias towards building the classifier. For example, some recipient prefers accuracy, whereas the others prefer interpretability; or some prefers recall, whereas the others prefer precision, and so on. In other cases, the recipient may not know exactly what to do before seeing the data, such as visual data mining, where the human makes decisions based on certain distributions of data records at each step. Publishing the data provides the recipient a greater flexibility of data analysis.
Our insight is as follows: Typically, the data contains overly specific "noises" that are harmful to classification. To construct a classifier, noises need to be generalized into patterns that are shared by more records in the same class. The data also contains "redundant structures." For example, if any of Education and W ork Hrs is sufficient for determining the class and if one of them is distorted, the class can still be determined from the other attribute. Our approach exploits such rooms provided by noises and redundant structures to mask the data without compromising the quality of classification. To this end, we propose an information metric to focus masking operations on the noises and redundant structures. We conducted intensive experiments to evaluate the impact of anonymization on the classification of future data. Below are several useful features of our approach.
. Information and privacy guided top-down refinement (TDR The notion of k-anonymity was first proposed in [1] . In general, a cost metric is used to measure the data distortion of anonymization. Two types of cost metric have been considered. The first type, based on the notion of minimal generalization [2] , [6] , is independent of the purpose of the data release. The second type factors in the purpose of the data release such as classification [7] . The goal is to find the optimal k-anonymization that minimizes this cost metric. In general, achieving optimal k-anonymization is NP -hard [8] , [9] . Greedy methods were proposed in [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , and [15] . Scalable algorithms (with the exponential complexity, the worst case) for finding the optimal k-anonymization were studied in [2] , [6] , [7] , and [16] .
Our insight is that the optimal k-anonymization is not suitable to classification where masking structures and masking noises have different effects: the former deems to damage classification, whereas the latter helps classification. It is well known in data mining and machine learning that the unmodified data, which has the lowest possible cost according to any cost metric, often has a worse classification than some generalized (that is, masked) data. In a similar spirit, less masked data could have a worse classification than some more masked data. This observation was confirmed by our experiments. The optimal k-anonymization seeks to minimize the error on the training data, thus overfits the data, subject to the privacy constraint. Neither the overfitting nor the privacy constraint is relevant to the classification goal that seeks to minimize the error on future data.
Besides the standard setting, extensions of k-anonymity were also studied. LeFevre et al. [17] proposed the notion of multidimensional k-anonymity, where data generalization is over multidimension-at-a-time, and LeFevre et al. [18] extended multidimensional generalization to anonymize data for a specific task such as classification. Xu et al. [19] proposed some greedy methods to achieve k-anonymity with cell generalization and showed that the cell generalization generally causes less information loss than the multidimensional generalization. These masking operations allow the coexistence of a specific value and a general value, such as Bachelor and University in Table 1 . Such masked data will suffer from "interpretation difficulty" in the data analysis phase. For example, the exact number of bachelors cannot be determined when only some, say, only three out of the 10 Bachelors are generalized to Universities. If a classifier is built from such data, it is unclear which classification rule, Bachelor ! Y or University ! N, should be used to classify bachelor.
Machanavajjhala [20] measured anonymity by the l-diversity that corresponds to some notion of uncertainty of linking a QID to a particular sensitive value. Wang et al. [21] , [22] proposed to bound the confidence of inferring a particular sensitive value using one or more privacy templates specified by the data provider. Wong et al. [15] proposed some generalization methods to simultaneously achieve k-anonymity and bound the confidence. Xiao and Tao [23] limited the breach probability, which is similar to the notion of confidence, and allowed a flexible threshold for each individual. k-anonymization for data owned by multiple parties was considered in [24] . k-anonymization for sequential releases was studied in [25] .
PROBLEM DEFINITION
A data provider wants to release a person-specific Fig. 1 . To prevent linking through any combination of the identifying attributes, the data provider can specify QID ¼ fEducation; Sex; W ork Hrsg.
Definition 1 generalizes the classic notion of k-anonymity by allowing multiple QIDs (with possibly different thresholds). Suppose that the data provider wants to release a table T ðA; B; C; D; SÞ, where S is the sensitive attribute and knows that the recipient has access to previously released tables T 1ðA; B; XÞ and T 2ðC; D; Y Þ, where X and Y are attributes not in T . To prevent linking the records in T to X or Y , the data provider only has to specify the k-anonymity on QID1 ¼ fA; Bg and QID2 ¼ fC; Dg. In this case, enforcing the k-anonymity on QID ¼ fA; B; C; Dg will distort the data more than what is necessary. All previous works suffer from this problem because they handled multiple QIDs through the single QID made up of all attributes in the multiple QIDs.
To transform T to satisfy the anonymity requirement, we consider three types of masking operations on the attributes D j in [QID i . Masking Operations:
1. Generalize D j if D j is a categorical attribute with a taxonomy tree. A leaf node represents a domain value and a parent node represents a less specific value. Fig. 2 shows a taxonomy tree for Education. A generalized D j can be viewed as a "cut" through its taxonomy tree. A cut of a tree is a subset of values in the tree, denoted Cut j , which contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf path. This type of generalization does not suffer from the interpretation difficulty discussed in Section 1, and it was previously employed in [7] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [24] , and [25] The cost metric for our anonymization should be measured by the classification error on the future data. It does not work to replace this cost metric by the classification error on the masked table because a perfect classifier for the masked table (say, a classifier based on a systemassigned record ID) can be inaccurate for the future data.
For this reason, our problem does not have a closed-form cost metric, and an "optimal" solution to our problem is not necessarily an optimal k-anonymization based on a closedform cost metric, and vice versa. Therefore, the previous optimal k-anonymization approaches [7] , [16] based on a closed-form cost metric are not suitable. A more reasonable approach is minimally, not always optimally, masking the data, with focus on classification. We will present such an approach in Section 3.
It is impractical to enumerate all masked tables because the number of masked tables can be very large. For a categorical attribute with a taxonomy tree Y , the number of possible cuts, denoted CðY Þ, is equal to 
SEARCH CRITERIA
A table T can be masked by a sequence of refinements starting from the most masked state in which each attribute is either generalized to the topmost value, suppressed to the special value ?, or represented by a single interval. Our method iteratively refines a masked value selected from the current set of cuts, suppressed values, and intervals, until violating the anonymity requirement. Each refinement increases the information and decreases the anonymity since records with specific values are more distinguishable. The key is selecting the "best" refinement at each step with both impacts considered.
Refinement
Below, we formally describe the notion of refinement on different types of attributes D j 2 [QID i and define a selection criterion for a single refinement.
Refinement for Generalization
Consider a categorical attribute D j with a user-specified taxonomy tree. Let childðvÞ be the set of child values of v in a user-specified taxonomy tree. A refinement, written v ! childðvÞ, replaces the parent value v with the child value in childðvÞ that generalizes the domain value in each (generalized) record that contains v. 
Refinement for Suppression
For a categorical attribute D j without taxonomy tree, a refinement ? j ! fv; ? j g refers to disclosing one value v from the set of suppressed values Sup j . Let R ? j denote the set of suppressed records that currently contain ? j . Disclosing v means replacing ? j with v in all records in R ?j that originally contain v.
Refinement for Discretization
For a continuous attribute, refinement is similar to that for generalization except that no prior taxonomy tree is given and the taxonomy tree has to be grown dynamically in the process of refinement. Initially, the interval that covers the full range of the attribute forms the root. The refinement on an interval v, which is written as v ! childðvÞ, refers to the optimal split of v into two child intervals childðvÞ that maximizes the information gain. The anonymity is not used for finding a split good for classification. This is similar to defining a taxonomy tree where the main consideration is how the taxonomy best describes the application. Due to this extra step of identifying the optimal split of the parent interval, we treat continuous attributes separately from categorical attributes with taxonomy trees. A refinement is valid (with respect to T ) if T satisfies the anonymity requirement after the refinement. A refinement is beneficial (with respect to T ) if more than one class is involved in the refined records. A refinement is performed only if it is both valid and beneficial. Therefore, a refinement guarantees that every newly generated qid has aðqidÞ ! k.
Example 3. Continue with Example 2. Fig. 2 shows a cut, indicated by the dashed curve. This cut is the lowest (maximal) in the sense that any refinement on Junior Sec: or Grad School would violate the anonymity requirement, that is, invalid. Also, refinement on Junior Sec: or Grad School is nonbeneficial since none of them refines data records in different classes.
Selection Criterion
We propose a selection criterion for guiding our TDR process to heuristically maximize the classification goal. Consider a refinement v ! childðvÞ, where v 2 D j , and D j is a categorical attribute with a user-specified taxonomy tree or D j is a continuous attribute with a dynamically grown taxonomy tree. The refinement has two effects: it increases the information of the refined records with respect to classification, and it decreases the anonymity of the refined records with respect to privacy. These effects are measured by "information gain," denoted InfoGainðvÞ, and "anonymity loss," denoted AnonyLossðvÞ. v is a good candidate for refinement if InfoGainðvÞ is large and AnonyLossðvÞ is small. Our selection criterion is choosing the candidate v, for the next refinement, that has the maximum informationgain/anonymity-loss trade-off, which is defined as
To avoid division by zero, 1 is added to AnonyLossðvÞ. Each choice of InfoGainðvÞ and AnonyLossðvÞ gives a trade-off between classification and anonymization. It should be noted that Score is not a goodness metric of k-anonymization. In fact, it is difficult to have a closed-form metric to capture the classification goal (on future data). We achieve this goal through this heuristic selection criterion. For concreteness, we borrow Shannon's information theory to measure information gain [26] . Let R v denote the set of records masked to the value v, and let R c denote the set of records masked to a child value c in childðvÞ after refining v. Let jxj be the number of elements in a set x. jR v j ¼ P c jR c j, where c 2 childðvÞ. InfoGain(v): Defined as
where IðR x Þ is the entropy of R x [26] :
clsÞ is the number of data records in R x having the class cls. Intuitively, IðR x Þ measures the entropy (or "impurity") of classes in R x . The more dominating the majority class in R x is, the smaller the IðR x Þ becomes (that is, less entropy in R x ). Therefore, IðR x Þ measures the error because nonmajority classes are considered as errors.
InfoGainðvÞ then measures the reduction of entropy after refining v. InfoGainðvÞ is nonnegative. For more details on information gain and classification, see [27] . AnonyLoss(v): Defined as
where 
InfoGain versus Score
An alternative to Score is using InfoGain alone, that is, maximizing the information gain produced by a refinement without considering the loss of anonymity. This alternative may pick a candidate that has a large reduction in anonymity, which may lead to a quick violation of the anonymity requirement, thereby, prohibiting refining the data to a lower granularity. The next example illustrates this point. ANY Edu ! f8th; 9th; 10thg; ANY Sex ! fM; F g; and ½1 À 99Þ ! f½1 À 40Þ; ½40 À 99Þg: Table 2b shows the calculated InfoGain, AnonyLoss, and Score of the three candidate refinements. According to the InfoGain criterion, ANY Edu will be first refined because it has the highest InfoGain. The result is shown in Table 2c with AðQIDÞ ¼ 4. After that, there is no further valid refinement because refining either ANY Sex or [1-99) will result in a violation of 4-anonymity. Note that the first 24 records in the table fail to separate the 4N from the other 20Y. In contrast, according to the Score criterion, ANY Sex will be first refined. The result is shown in Table 2d , and AðQIDÞ ¼ 14. Subsequently, further refinement on ANY Edu is invalid because it will result in aðh9th; M; ½1 À 99ÞiÞ ¼ 2 < k, but the refinement on [1-99) is valid because it will result in AðQIDÞ ¼ 6 ! k. The final masked table is shown in Table 2e where the information for separating the two classes is preserved. Thus, by considering the information/anonymity trade-off, the Score criterion produces a more desirable sequence of refinements for classification.
TDR 4.1 The Algorithm
We present our algorithm TDR. In a preprocessing step, we compress the given table T by removing all attributes not in [QID i and collapsing duplicates into a single row with the Class column storing the class frequency as in Table 1. The  compressed table is typically much smaller than the original  table. Below, the term "data records" refers to data records in this compressed form. There exists a masked table satisfying the anonymity requirement if and only if the most masked table does, that is, jT j ! k. This condition is checked in the preprocessing step as well. To focus on main ideas, we assume that jT j ! k and the compressed table fits in the memory. In Section 4.5, we will discuss the modification needed if the compressed 
Assume that the taxonomy trees in Fig. 1 Our algorithm obtains the masked T by iteratively refining the table from the most masked state. An important property of TDR is that the anonymity requirement is antimonotone with respect to the TDR: If it is violated before a refinement, it remains violated after the refinement. This is because a refinement never equates distinct values; therefore, it never increases the count of duplicates aðqidÞ. Hence, the hierarchically organized search space with the most masked state at the top is separated by a border above which lie all satisfying states and below which lie all violating states. The TDR finds a state on the border, and this state is maximally refined in that any further refinement of it would cross the border and violate the anonymity requirement. Note that there may be more than one maximally refined state on the border. Our algorithm finds the one based on the heuristic selection criterion of maximizing Score at each step. Samarati [2] presents some results related to antimonotonicity, but the results are based on a different masking model that generalizes all values in an attribute to the same level and suppresses data at the record level. 
Find the Best Refinement (Line 4)

This step makes use of computed
InfoGainðxÞ and A x ðQID i Þ for all candidates x in h[Cut j ; [Sup j ; [Int j i and computed AðQID i Þ for each QID i . Before the first iteration, such information is computed in an initialization step for every topmost value, every suppressed value, and every full-range interval. For each subsequent iteration, such information comes from the update in the previous iteration (Line 6). Finding the best refinement Best involves at most j [ Cut j j þ j [ Sup j j þ j [ Int j j computations of Score without accessing data records. Updating InfoGainðxÞ and A x ðQID i Þ will be considered in Section 4.4.
Perform the Best Refinement (Line 5)
We consider two cases of performing the Best refinement, corresponding to whether a taxonomy tree is available for the attribute D j for Best.
Case 1: D j has a taxonomy tree. Consider the refinement Best ! childðBestÞ, where Best 2 D j and D j is either a categorical attribute with a specified taxonomy tree or a continuous attribute with a dynamically grown taxonomy tree. First, we replace Best with childðBestÞ in h[Cut j ; [Int j i. Then, we need to retrieve R Best , the set of data records masked to Best, to tell the child value in childðBestÞ for each individual data record. We present a data structure Taxonomy Indexed PartitionS (TIPS) to facilitate this operation. This data structure is also crucial for updating InfoGainðxÞ and A x ðQID i Þ for candidates x. The general idea is to group data records according to their masked records on [QID i .
Definition 3 (TIPS)
. TIPS is a tree structure with each node representing a masked record over [QID i and each child node representing a refinement of the parent node on exactly one attribute. Stored with each leaf node is the set of (compressed) data records having the same masked record, called a leaf partition.
For each candidate refinement x, P x denotes a leaf partition whose masked record contains x, and Link x denotes the link of all such P x . The head of Link x is stored with x.
The masked table is represented by the leaf partitions of TIPS. Link x provides a direct access to R x , the set of (original) data records masked by the value x. Initially, TIPS has only one leaf partition containing all data records, masked by the topmost value or interval on every attribute in [QID i . In each iteration, we perform the best refinement Best by refining the leaf partitions on Link Best .
Refine Best in TIPS. We refine each leaf partition P Best found on Link Best as follows: For each value c in childðBestÞ, a child partition P c is created under P Best , and data records in P Best are split among the child partitions: P c contains a data record in P Best if a categorical value c generalizes the corresponding domain value in the record or if an interval c contains the corresponding domain value in the record, an empty P c is removed. Link c is created to link up all P c s for the same c. Also, link P c to every Link x to which P Best was previously linked, except for Link Best .
Finally, mark c as "beneficial" if R c has more than one class, where R c denotes the set of data records masked to c. This is the only operation that actually accesses data records in the whole algorithm. The overhead is maintaining Link x . For each attribute in [QID i and each leaf partition on Link Best , there are at most jchildðBestÞj "relinkings." Therefore, there are at most j [ QID i j Â jLink Best j Â jchildðBestÞj "relinkings" for applying Best. Let the best refinement be ½1 À 99Þ ! f½1 À 37Þ; ½37 À 99Þg on W ork Hrs. We create two child partitions under the root partition as in Fig. 3 and split data records between them. Both child partitions are on Link ANY Edu and Link ANY Sex . [Int j is updated into f½1 À 37Þ; ½37 À 99Þg and [Cut j remains unchanged. Suppose that the next best refinement is ANY Edu ! fSecondary; Universityg, which refines the two leaf partitions on Link ANY Edu , resulting in the TIPS in Fig. 3 .
Count statistics in TIPS.
A scalable feature of our algorithm is maintaining some statistical information for each candidate x in h[Cut j , [Int j i for updating ScoreðxÞ without accessing data records. For each value c in childðBestÞ added to h[Cut j ; [Int j i in the current iteration, we collect the following count statistics of c while scanning data records in P Best for updating TIPS: 1) jR c j, jR d j, freqðR c ; clsÞ, and freqðR d ; clsÞ for computing InfoGainðcÞ, where d 2 childðcÞ and cls is a class label. Refer to Section 3 for these notations. 2) jP d j, where P d is a child partition under P c as if c is refined, kept together with the leaf node for P c . This information will be used in Section 4.4.
TIPS has several useful properties: 1) All data records in the same leaf partition have the same masked record, although they may have different refined values. 2) Every data record appears in exactly one leaf partition. 3) Each leaf partition P x has exactly one masked qid j on QID j and contributes the count jP x j towards aðqid j Þ. Later, we use the last property to extract aðqid j Þ from TIPS.
Case 2: D j has no taxonomy tree. Consider a refinement ? j ! fBest; ? j g, where ? j 2 D j , and D j is a categorical attribute without a taxonomy tree. First, we remove Best from Sup j . Then, we replace ? j with the disclosed value Best in all suppressed records that currently contain ? j and originally contain Best. The TIPS data structure in Definition 3 can also support the refinement operation in this case. ; clsÞ, and freqðR x ; clsÞ for computing InfoGainðxÞ, where x 2 [Sup j and cls is a class label. 2) jP y j, where P y is a child partition under P x as if x is disclosed, kept together with the leaf node for P x . This information will be used in Section 4.4.
Update Score and Validity (Line 6)
This step updates ScoreðxÞ and validity for candidates x in h[Cut j ; [Sup j ; [Int j i to reflect the impact of the Best refinement. The key is computing ScoreðxÞ from the count statistics maintained in Section 4.3 without accessing data records. We update InfoGainðxÞ and A x ðQID i Þ separately. Note that the updated AðQID i Þ is obtained from A Best ðQID i Þ.
Update InfoGainðxÞ
An observation is that InfoGainðxÞ is not affected by Best ! childðBestÞ, except that we need to compute InfoGainðcÞ for each newly added value c in childðBestÞ. InfoGainðcÞ can be computed while collecting the count statistics for c in Case 1 of Section 4.3. In case the refined attribute has no taxonomy tree, InfoGainðxÞ can be computed from the count statistics for x in Case 2 of Section 4.3.
Update AnonyLossðxÞ
Again, we consider the two cases:
Case 1: D j has a taxonomy tree. Unlike information gain, it is not enough to compute A c ðQID i Þ only for the new values c in childðBestÞ. Recall that A x ðQID i Þ is equal to the minimum aðqid i Þ after refining x. If both attðxÞ and attðBestÞ are contained in QID i , the refinement on Best may affect this minimum, hence, A x ðQID i Þ. Below, we AðQID i Þ is equal to the minimum aðqid i Þ in QIT i . In other words, QIT i provides an index of aðqid i Þ by qid i . Unlike TIPS, QITS does not maintain data records. On applying Best ! childðBestÞ, we update every QIT i such that QID i contains the attribute attðBestÞ.
Update QIT i . For each occurrence of Best in QIT i , create a separate branch for each c in childðBestÞ. The procedure in Algorithm 2 computes aðqid i Þ for the newly created qid i s on such branches. The general idea is to loop through each P c on Link c in TIPS, increment aðqid i Þ by jP c j. This step does not access data records because jP c j was part of the count statistics of Best. Let r be the number of QID i containing attðBestÞ. The number of aðqid i Þ to be computed is at most r Â jLink Best j Â jchildðBestÞj.
Algorithm 2.
Computing aðqid i Þ for new qid i 1. for each P c 2 Link c do 2.
for each QID i containing attðBestÞ do 3. aðqid i Þ ¼ aðqid i Þ þ jP c j, where qid i is the masked value on QID i for P c 4.
end for 5. end for Example 8. In Fig. 4 Case 2: D j has no taxonomy tree. Even the refined attribute has no taxonomy tree, the general operation of computing AnonyLossðxÞ is the same as Case 1. The difference is that the refined values of ? j becomes fBest; ? j g, where Best is the disclosed value and the updated ? j represents the remaining suppressed values Sup j . Also, the candidate set includes [Sup j , that is, h[Cut j ; [Sup j ; [Int j i. On disclosing Best, we update all QIT i such that attðBestÞ is in QIT i to reflect the move of records from Link ?j to Link Best .
Update QIT i . For each occurrence of ? j in QIT i , create a separate branch for Best and a separate branch for updated ? j . Follow the procedure in Algorithm 2 to compute aðqid i Þ for the newly created qid i s on such branches, except that P c s become P Best and P 0 ? j . Refer to Case 2 in Section 4.3 for these notations.
Efficiency Analysis
Each iteration involves two types of work. The first type accesses data records in R Best or R ?j for updating TIPS and count statistics in Section 4.3. If Best is an interval, an extra step is required for determining the optimal split for each child interval c in childðBestÞ. This requires making a scan on records in R c , which is a subset of R Best . To determine a split, R c has to be sorted, which can be an expensive operation. Fortunately, resorting R c is unnecessary for each iteration because its superset R Best are already sorted. Thus, this type of work involves one scan of the records being refined in each iteration. The second type of work computes ScoreðxÞ for the candidates x in h[Cut j ; [Sup j ; [Int j i without accessing data records in Section 4.4. For a table with m attributes and each taxonomy tree with at most p nodes, the number of such x is at most m Â p. This computation makes use of the maintained count statistics and does not access data records. Let h be the maximum number of times that a value in a record will be refined. For an attribute with a taxonomy tree, h is bounded by the height of the taxonomy tree, and for an attribute without taxonomy tree, h is bounded by 1 (that is, a suppressed value is refined at most once). In the whole computation, each record will be refined at most m Â h times, therefore accessed at most m Â h times because only refined records are accessed. Since m Â h is a small constant independent of the table size, our algorithm is linear in the table size.
In the special case that there is only a single QID, each root-to-leaf path in TIPS has represented a qid, and we can store aðqidÞ directly at the leaf partitions in TIPS without QITS. A single QID was considered in [7] , [10] , [12] , and [16] where the QID contains all potentially identifying attributes to be used for linking the table to an external source. Our algorithm is more efficient in this special case.
To focus on main ideas, our current implementation assumes that the compressed table fits in memory. Often, this assumption is valid because the compressed table can be much smaller than the original table. If the compressed table does not fit in the memory, we can store leaf partitions of TIPS on disk if necessary. Favorably, the memory is used to keep only leaf partitions that are smaller than the page size to avoid fragmentation of disk pages. A nice property of TDR is that leaf partitions that cannot be further refined (that is, on which there is no candidate refinement) can be discarded, and only some statistics for them needs to be kept. This likely applies to small partitions in memory, therefore, the memory demand is unlikely to build up.
Compared to iteratively masking the data bottom-up starting from domain values, the TDR is more natural and efficient for handling continuous attributes. To produce a small number of intervals for a continuous attribute, the top-down approach needs only a small number of interval splitting, whereas the bottom-up approach needs many interval merging starting from many domain values. In addition, the top-down approach can discard data records that cannot be further refined, whereas the bottom-up approach has to keep all data records until the end of computation.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our goal in this section is to evaluate the proposed method, that is, TDR, in terms of preserving the usefulness for classification and the scalability on large data sets. For the usefulness evaluation, we compare the classifier built from the masked data with the classifier built from the unmodified data. This comparison makes sense because the anonymization is due to the privacy consideration and the data will be released without modification in the absence of such consideration. In addition, the unmodified data has the lowest possible cost, therefore, it serves the best possible candidate according to previous cost metrics [7] , [12] , [16] . Though some recent works such as that in [7] model the classification metric on the masked table, the optimality of such metrics does not translate into the optimality of classifiers, as pointed out in Section 1. To our knowledge, [12] is the only work that has evaluated the impact of anonymity on classification with single dimensional generalization. For these reasons, our evaluation uses the baseline of the unmodified data and the reported results in [12] . All experiments on TDR were conducted on an Intel Pentium IV 2.6-GHz PC with 1-Gbyte RAM.
Data Quality
Our first objective is to evaluate if the proposed TDR preserves the quality for classification while masking the data to satisfy various anonymity requirements. We used the C4.5 classifier [27] and Naive Bayesian classifier (from http://magix.fri.uni-lj.si/orange/) as classification models. We adopted three widely used benchmarks: Adult, Japanese Credit Screening (CRX), and German Credit Data (German) were obtained from the University of California, Irvine (UCI) repository [28] . Unless stated otherwise, all attributes were used for building classifiers.
In a typical real-life situation, the data provider releases all data records in a single file, leaving the split of training and testing sets to the data miner. Following this practice, we combined the training set and testing set into one set for masking and built a classifier using the masked training set and collected the error using the masked testing set. This error, called the anonymity error, denoted AE, was compared with the baseline error, denoted BE, for the unmodified training and testing sets. Note that AE depends on the anonymity requirement. AE À BE measures the quality loss due to data masking.
Data Set: Adult
The Adult data set has six continuous attributes, eight categorical attributes, and a binary Class column representing two income levels, 50K or > 50K. Table 3a describes each attribute (cont. for continuous and cat. for categorical). After removing records with missing values from the presplit training and testing sets, we have 30,162 and 15,060 records for training and testing, respectively. This is exactly the same data set as used in [12] .
For the same anonymity threshold k, a single QID is always more restrictive than breaking it into multiple QIDs. For this reason, we first consider the case of single QID. To ensure that masking is working on attributes that have an impact on classification, the QID contains the top N attributes ranked by the C4.5 classifier. The top rank attribute is the attribute at the top of the C4.5 decision tree. Then, we remove this attribute and repeat this process to determine the rank of other attributes. The top nine attributes are Cg, Ag, M, En, Re, H, S, E, and O in that order. We specified three anonymity requirements denoted Top5, Top7, and Top9, where the QID contains the top five, seven, and nine attributes, respectively. The upper error, denoted UE, refers to the error on the data with all the attributes in the QID removed (equivalent to generalizing them to the topmost ANY or suppressing them to ? or including them into a full-range interval). UE À BE measures the impact of the QID on classification. Fig. 5 displays AE for the C4.5 classifier with the anonymity threshold 20 k 1; 000 by applying discretization on the six continuous attributes and suppression on the eight categorical attributes without taxonomy trees. Note that k is not spaced linearly. We summarize the analysis for Top7 as follows: First, AE À BE, where BE ¼ 14:7 percent, is less than 2.5 percent over the entire range of tested anonymity threshold, and AE is much lower than UE ¼ 21:5 percent. This supports that accurate classification and privacy protection can coexist. Second, AE generally increases as the anonymity threshold k increases, but not monotonically. For example, the error slightly drops when k increases from 180 to 200. This is due to the variation between the training and testing sets, and the fact that a better structure may appear in a more masked state.
We further evaluate the effectiveness of generalization on categorical attributes with taxonomy trees. Although Iyengar [12] has specified taxonomy trees for categorical attributes, we do not agree with the author's groupings. For example, the author grouped Native-country according to continents, except Americas. We followed the grouping according to the World Factbook published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (http://www.cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/). Fig. 6a displays AE for the C4.5 classifier with the anonymity threshold 20 k 1; 000 by applying discretization on the six continuous attributes and generalization on the eight categorical attributes according to our specified taxonomy trees. We summarize the analysis for Top7 as follows: AE À BE, where BE ¼ 14:7 percent, is less than 2 percent over the range of anonymity threshold 20 k 600, and AE is much lower than UE ¼ 21:5 percent. These results are similar to the results in Fig. 5 although the finally masked versions of data are very different. This suggests that there exist redundant "good" classification structures in the data.
A closer look at the masked data for Top7 with k ¼ 500 reveals that among the seven top ranked attributes, three are masked to a different degree of granularity, and four, namely, Cg (ranked first), Ag (ranked second), Re (ranked fifth), and S (ranked seventh), are masked to the topmost value ANY . Even for this drastic masking, AE has only increased by 2 percent from BE ¼ 14:7 percent, whereas the worst case can be UE ¼ 21:5 percent. With the masking, classification now is performed by the remaining three attributes in the QID and the unmodified but lower ranked attributes. Clearly, this is a different classification structure from what would be found from the unmodified data. As a result, though masking may eliminate some structures, new structures emerge to help. Fig. 6b displays AE for the Naive Bayesian classifier. Compared to the C4.5 classifier, though BE and UE are higher (which has to do with the classification method, not the masking), the quality loss due to masking, AE À BE (note BE ¼ 18:07 percent), is smaller, which is no more than 1.5 percent for the range of anonymity threshold 20 k 1; 000. This suggests that the information-based masking is also useful to other classification methods such as the Naive Bayesian that do not use the information gain. Another observation is that AE is even lower than BE for the anonymity threshold k 180 for Top5 and Top7. This confirms again that the optimal k-anonymization is not relevant to the classification goal due to possibility of "overfitting." The unmodified data certainly has the least distortion by any cost metric. However, this experiment shows that the least distortion does not translate into the accuracy of classifier. AE < BE also occurs in the experiment on the CRX data set in Fig. 9a . Our approach is bias toward masking the noises in order to help classification. Fig. 7 shows the generated taxonomy trees for continuous attributes Hours-per-week and Education-num with Top7 and k ¼ 60. The splits are very reasonable. For example, in the taxonomy tree of Education-num, the split point at 13 distinguishes whether the person has post secondary education. If the user does not like these trees, she may modify them or specify her own and, subsequently, treat continuous attributes as categorical attributes with specified taxonomy trees.
Our method took at most 10 seconds for all previous experiments. Out of the 10 seconds, approximately 8 seconds were spent on reading data records from disk and writing the masked data to disk. The actual processing time for generalizing the data is relatively short.
In an effort to study the effectiveness of multiple QIDs, we compared AE between a multiple QIDs requirement and the corresponding single united QID requirement. We randomly generated 30 multiple QID requirements as follows: For each requirement, we first determined the number of QIDs using the uniform distribution U½3; 7 (that is, randomly drawn a number between 3 and 7) and the length of QIDs using U½2; 9. For simplicity, all QIDs in the same requirement have the same length and same threshold k ¼ 100. For each QID, we randomly selected some attributes according to the QID length from the 14 attributes.
A repeating QID was discarded. For example, a requirement of three QIDs and length two is fhfAg; Eng; ki, hfAg; Rag; ki, hfS; Hg; kig, and the corresponding single QID requirement is fhfAg; En; Ra; S; Hg; kig.
In Fig. 8 , each data point represents the AE of a multiple QID requirement, denoted MultiQID, and the AE of the corresponding single QID requirement, denoted SingleQID. The C4.5 classifier was used. Most data points appear at the upper left corner of the diagonal, suggesting that MultiQID generally yields lower AE than its corresponding Single-QID. This verifies the effectiveness of multiple QIDs to avoid unnecessary masking and improve data quality.
Data Set: CRX
The CRX data set is based on a credit card application. There are six continuous attributes, nine categorical attributes, and a binary class attribute representing the application status succeeded or failed. After removing records with missing values, there are 465 and 188 records for the presplit training and testing, respectively. In the UCI repository, all values and attribute names in CRX have been changed to meaningless symbols such as A 1 . . . A 15 . No taxonomy tree is given in advance. The Top9 attributes in CRX are A 9 , A 11 , A 10 , A 8 , A 15 , A 7 , A 14 , A 6 , and A 5 in that order. Fig. 9a displays AE for the C4.5 classifier with the anonymity threshold 20 k 600 by applying discretization on the six continuous attributes and suppression on the eight categorical attributes without taxonomy trees. Different anonymity requirements Top5, Top7, and Top9 yield similar AE's and similar patterns, indicating more restrictive requirement may not have much impact on classification Fig. 7 . Generated taxonomy trees of Hours-per-week and Education-num. quality. This largely depends on the availability of alternative "good" classification structures in the data set.
We summarize the analysis for Top7 as follows: First, AE À BE, where BE ¼ 15:4 percent, is less than 4 percent over the range of anonymity threshold 20 k 300, and AE is much lower than UE ¼ 42 percent. This supports that accurate classification and privacy protection can coexist. AE drastically increases when k > 300 since CRX only has 653 records.
Data Set: German
German has seven continuous attributes, 13 categorical attributes, and a binary class attribute representing the good or bad credit risks. There are 666 and 334 records, without missing values, for the presplit training and testing, respectively. Table 3b describes each attribute. The Top9 attributes in German are Cd, As, Du, Ch, Sa, I, Lp, D, and P r in that order. Fig. 9b displays AE for the C4.5 classifier with the anonymity threshold 20 k 1; 000 by applying discretization on the seven continuous attributes and suppression on the 13 categorical attributes without taxonomy trees. AE À BE, where BE ¼ 28:8 percent, is less than 4 percent over the range of anonymity threshold 20 k 100 for the anonymity requirement Top7. Although AE is mildly lower than UE ¼ 36 percent, the benefit of masking UE À AE is not as significant as in other data sets. If the data provider requires higher degree of anonymity, then she may consider simply removing the TopN attributes from the data set rather than masking them.
Comparing with Other Algorithms
Iyengar [12] presented a genetic algorithm solution. This experiment was customized to conduct a fair comparison with the results in [12] . We used the same Adult data set, same attributes, and same anonymity requirement as specified in [12] :
GA ¼ hfAg; W ; E; M; O; Ra; S; Ng; ki:
We obtained the taxonomy trees from the author for generalization, except for the continuous attribute Ag, which we used discretization. Following the procedure in [12] , all attributes not in GA were removed and were not used to produce BE, AE, and UE in this experiment, and all errors were based on the 10-fold cross validation and the C4.5 classifier. For each fold, we first masked the training data and then applied the masking to the testing data. Fig. 10 compares AE of TDR with the errors reported for two methods in [12] , Loss Metric (LM) and Classification Metric (CM), for 10 k 500. TDR outperformed LM, especially for k ! 100 but performed only slightly better than CM. TDR continued to perform well from k ¼ 500 to k ¼ 1; 000, for which no result was reported for LM and CM in [12] . This analysis shows that our method is at least comparable to genetic algorithm [12] in terms of accuracy. However, our method took only 7 seconds to mask the data, including reading data records from disk and writing the masked data to disk. Iyengar [12] reported that his method requires 18 hours to transform this data, which has about only 30K data records. Clearly, the genetic algorithm is not scalable.
Recently, [18] made a comparison with our previous version of TDR in [14] in terms of data quality on some other data sets. Their experiments suggested that the classification quality on the masked data can be further improved by using a more flexible masking operation, multidimensional generalization; however, this type of generalization suffers from the interpretation difficulty as discussed in Section 1. Xu et al. [19] reported that the multidimensional generalization algorithm took about 10 seconds to mask the Adult data set. We compared TDR with some recently developed greedy anonymization algorithms that also conducted experiments on the Adult data set. The efficiency of the bottom-up cell generalization algorithm in [15] is comparable to TDR when k ¼ 2, 10, but they did not report the efficiency for larger k. A cell generalization algorithm in [19] took about 60 seconds to mask the data. In general, multidimensional and cell generalization algorithms are less efficient than our method due to the larger number of possible masked tables.
Efficiency and Scalability
This experiment evaluates the scalability of TDR by blowing up the size of the Adult data set. First, we combined the training and testing sets, giving 45,222 records. For each original record r in the combined set, we created À 1 "variations" of r, where > 1 is the blowup scale. For each variation of r, we randomly selected q attributes from [QID j , where q has the uniform distribution U½1; j [ QID j j, that is, randomly drawn between 1 and the number of attributes in QIDs and replaced the values on the selected attributes with values randomly drawn from the domain of the attributes. Together with all original records, the enlarged data set has Â 45; 222 records. To provide a precise evaluation, the runtime reported excludes the time for loading data records from disk and the time for writing the masked data to disk. Fig. 11 depicts the runtime of TDR using generalization and discretization for 200,000 to 1,000,000 data records and the anonymity threshold k ¼ 50 based on two types of anonymity requirements. AllAttQID refers to the single QID having all 14 attributes. This is one of the most timeconsuming settings because of the largest number of candidate refinements to consider at each iteration. For TDR, the small anonymity threshold of k ¼ 50 requires more iterations to reach a solution, hence, more runtime, than a larger threshold. TDR takes approximately 80 seconds to transform 1,000,000 records. In Fig. 11 , MultiQID refers to the average runtime over the 30 random multiple QID requirements in Section 5.1 with k ¼ 50. Compared to AllAttQID, TDR becomes less efficient for handling multiple QIDs for two reasons. First, an anonymity requirement on multiple QIDs is a less restrictive constraint than the single QID anonymity requirement containing all attributes; therefore, TDR has to perform more refinements before violating the anonymity requirement. Moreover, TDR needs to create one QIT for each QID and maintains aðqidÞ in QITS. The increase is roughly by a factor proportional to the number of QIDs in an anonymity requirement. The runtime of suppression and discretization on this expanded data set is roughly the same as shown in Fig. 11 .
Summary
Our experiments verified several claims about the proposed TDR method. First, TDR masks a given table to satisfy a broad range of anonymity requirements without sacrificing significantly the usefulness to classification. Second, while producing a comparable accuracy, TDR is much more efficient than previously reported approaches, particularly, the genetic algorithm in [12] . Third, the previous optimal k-anonymization [7] , [16] does not necessarily translate into the optimality of classification. The proposed TDR finds a better anonymization solution for classification. Fourth, the proposed TDR scales well with large data sets and complex anonymity requirements. These performances together with the features discussed in Section 1 make TDR a practical technique for privacy protection while sharing information.
CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of ensuring an individual's anonymity while releasing person-specific data for classification analysis. We pointed out that the previous optimal k-anonymization based on a closed-form cost metric does not address the classification requirement. Our approach is based on two observations specific to classification: Information specific to individuals tends to be overfitting, thus of little utility, to classification; even if a masking operation eliminates some useful classification structures, alternative structures in the data emerge to help. Therefore, not all data items are equally useful for classification and less useful data items provide the room for anonymizing the data without compromising the utility. With these observations, we presented a top-down approach to iteratively refine the data from a general state into a special state, guided by maximizing the trade-off between information and anonymity. This top-down approach serves a natural and efficient structure for handling categorical and continuous attributes and multiple anonymity requirements. Experiments showed that our approach effectively preserves both information utility and individual's privacy and scales well for large data sets.
Benjamin C.M. Fung received the BSc and MSc degrees in computing science from Simon Fraser University. He is currently a PhD candidate at Simon Fraser with the postgraduate scholarship doctoral award from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). His recent research interests include privacy-preserving data mining/publishing, secure distributed computing, and text mining. Before pursuing his PhD, he worked in the R&D Department at Business Objects and designed reporting systems for various enterprise resource planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) systems. He has published in data mining and security conferences, journals, and books. He has served on program committees for international conferences.
Ke Wang received the PhD degree from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is currently a professor at the School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University. Before joining Simon Fraser, he was an associate professor at the National University of Singapore. He has taught in the areas of database and data mining. His research interests include database technology, data mining and knowledge discovery, machine learning, and emerging applications, with recent interests focusing on the end use of data mining. This includes explicitly modeling the business goal (such as profit mining, biomining, and Web mining) and exploiting user prior knowledge (such as extracting unexpected patterns and actionable knowledge). He is interested in combining the strengths of various fields such as database, statistics, and machine learning and optimization to provide actionable solutions to real-life problems. He is an associate editor of the IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering and has served on program committees for international conferences. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
